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Abstract
Background: After its outbreak in China, the novel COronaVIrus Disease 19 is spreading across the globe. It is an
emergency the world has never seen before.
Main text: The attention of health systems is mainly focused on COronaVIrus Disease 19 patients and on the risk
that intensive care units might be overwhelmed by the serious pulmonary complications. Different countries are
also attempting to establish infection prevention and control strategies which proved effective in China where the
outbreak was initially reported. We reflect on important lessons to be learnt from different countries. The effects
that infection prevention and control strategies, such as social distancing or isolation, can have on the care of
millions of patients with non-communicable diseases, who may be indirectly affected, have not been taken into
consideration so much.
Conclusions: When dealing with COronaVIrus Disease 19, policy makers and healthcare personnel should consider
the indirect effects on the treatment of non-communicable diseases.
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Background
After its outbreak in China, the novel COronaVIrus
Disease 19 (COVID-19) [1] spread across the globe with
more than 15,000,000 confirmed cases in 188 countries
and territories up to 23 July 2020 [2]. Many lessons can
be learnt from what has been experienced over the past
months. When COVID-19 cases sharply increase, strict
infection prevention and control (IPC) strategies are im-
plemented. Two paradigms, containment and mitigation,
are usually taken into consideration [3]. Containment is
designed to prevent community transmission at the start
of an outbreak, by tracking disease dissemination to
allow for targeted quarantines. Mitigation strategies are
implemented when disease outpaces containment, by
promoting travel restrictions, closing schools, canceling
sporting events, or even the blockade of productive and
commercial activities. The impact of IPC measures is
likely to depend on how early they are taken, in the con-
text of local epidemiological, social, and political situa-
tions [4, 5]. However, at an early stage, decision makers
are often afraid of the economic consequences, and con-
flicting messages may be released to the population [6–
8]. When, finally, COVID-19 cases rapidly increase in a
few days or weeks [2, 9, 10], emergency health facilities
may be overwhelmed [8, 11, 12], and decision makers
may not have enough time to accept, adapt, and imple-
ment their response accordingly [13]. Resources are then
mainly allocated to enhance emergency care, and are
deflected from facilities for non-communicable diseases
(NCDs) (including cardiovascular diseases, cancer,
chronic kidney disease, chronic liver disease, chronic re-
spiratory disease, endocrine and metabolic disorders)
[14]. For their part, patients with NCDs are reluctant to
visit health facilities for fear of becoming infected, and
new care models, including telemedicine, may not yet be
fully implemented. The diffidence of NCD patients in
seeking assistance and the inability of healthcare pro-
viders to assist them can become major challenges. If we
consider the hundreds of millions of patients with
NCDs, the impact of COVID-19 on NCD-related deaths
(in uninfected patients) is likely to become more signifi-
cant in the coming months than those directly affected
by the infection.
In the upcoming sections, we will briefly summarize the
epidemiological trajectory of COVID-19 impact on the
world, highlighting the lessons learnt in some countries in
different world areas, bringing to the forefront the impli-
cations in caring for patients with NCDs affected indir-
ectly. China and South Korea soon passed the peak of the
epidemic; Italy, Spain, France, Germany, and other
European countries are exiting this phase; the United
States (U.S.), South America, and Africa are now experien-
cing an upward trend while Australia and New Zealand
have largely contained the infections. Considering that
many low-income regions have not yet gone through the
most severe phase, lessons learnt could be effectively ap-
plied to establish new outpatient care models based on the
successes in other regions, before COVID-19 becomes an
unsolvable crisis that could cripple many fragile health
systems [15].
Health policy and lessons learnt
Most countries moved from containment to mitigation,
albeit at differing paces (Fig. 1). Comparisons and mea-
surements of the effectiveness of interventions are diffi-
cult. Although absolute numbers of cases are available
[2], the criteria by which they were collected and in par-
ticular the criteria for access to diagnosis (what defines a
suspected case) are different in different countries.
Therefore, there is an uneven and incorrect use of statis-
tics in the comparison of rates between countries. Differ-
ences may be related to differences in the definition of
“suspected case” (very symptomatic, mild symptomatic,
asymptomatic) and thus access to diagnosis rather than
to the country’s restriction measures. The World Health
Organization (WHO) has been very active in helping all
countries across the globe, and it provided a guidance
for responding to community transmission of COVID-
19 [14, 16, 17]. These indications are largely based on
evidence from the analysis of the responses of countries
affected by the COVID-19 outbreak early on.
The birth of two models in Asia
China and lockdown
The first COVID-19 outbreak occurred in Wuhan dur-
ing the “Spring Festival Travel Season” (Chunyun, 10
January 2020) when massive population movement took
place. In Wuhan, vigorous and multifaceted measures of
containment, mitigation, and suppression were tempor-
ally associated with improved control of the epidemic
when there was neither an effective drug nor vaccine. In
a city with 10 million residents, mitigation measures,
such as traffic restriction, cancelation of social gather-
ings, and home quarantine, were associated with a re-
duction in the degree of transmission. Between 23
January and 1 February, the local government first
blocked all outbound transportation from the city and
subsequently suspended public transit and banned all ve-
hicular traffic within the city [18]. When the Chinese
government decided to close the city of Wuhan (11 mil-
lion people), the world was stunned and experts were
skeptical. Such a large lockdown, subsequently expanded
to almost the entire province of Hubei (60 million
people), had never been enforced in the modern world
and might not have worked. But today the Beijing ap-
proach seems justified [18]. The main mitigation actions
undertaken by China were (a) travel restrictions (public
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and private), (b) closing schools (children at home), and
(c) remote work (adults at home).
a) Travel restrictions. According to modeling studies
[19, 20], Wuhan travel restrictions delayed epidemic
progression within China by 3 to 5 days and
international travel restrictions did help to slow
spread elsewhere in the world until mid-February
[19]. Hand washing, self-isolation, and household
quarantine were probably more effective than travel
restrictions at mitigating this pandemic [19].
b) Virtual classroom (children at home). The Chinese
Ministry of Education shared instructions for
conducting online teaching for students [21],
providing 24,000 online courses from over 20
online platforms at no cost [22]. The “home
education” program with live streaming lessons has
been accepted by more than 20 provinces and is
currently followed by over 10,000 primary and
secondary schools and 5 million students.
According to the Monitoring Report of the United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organisation (UNESCO) [23], the example was
followed by 192 countries who had implemented
nationwide closures, affecting about 99% of the
world’s student population [20].
c) Remote working (adults at home). Since 3 February,
when local governments and companies across the
nation encouraged workers to stay at home,
millions of Chinese have started experiencing the
home office for the first time.
The Chinese population proved to be prepared in
technological terms thanks to a network of information
disseminated on a capillary level in real time. WeChat—
a super app that combines messaging, file transfer,
video-conferencing capabilities, e-payment, and other
functions—is ubiquitous, with over a billion users in
China. WeChat and Baidu Maps also released clinical in-
formation covering over 100 cities across China and over
3000 clinics. Patients could identify the hospitals desig-
nated to treat coronavirus on their phones, dramatically
reducing confusion and waiting time.
South Korea and tracking
Tracking patients and a broad testing strategy were
major contributors in overcoming the COVID-19 out-
break in South Korea [24, 25]. Cell phone GPS data
Fig. 1 Relationship between the first confirmed case of COVID-19 and establishment of restriction measures in countries of different world areas
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(available to the police authorities), credit card archives
(kept by financial institutions), recordings of surveillance
cameras, and archives of access to clinics and pharma-
cies were linked by the government [25]. When an indi-
vidual is admitted with COVID-19 symptoms, the
government retrieves the data spanning the previous 14
days in order to identify people with whom they came
into contact (with the help of facial recognition and
other technology implemented in public and private
areas). Those people potentially exposed to the infection
are then contacted and targeted quarantine measures
established; these measures would be questionable for
privacy violations in many other countries. However, in
South Korea, the legislative system was already prepared
in this sense by the previous wave of severe acute re-
spiratory syndrome (SARS). Tracking patients, also ap-
plied in Hong Kong and Singapore, allowed the
countries not to enforce lockdown, limiting quarantine
only to those who had close contact with the infected
person. In South Korea, an app called “Corona 100m”
was also made available for download on South Korean
smartphones. The app allows citizens to know if they
breach a 100-m (328-ft) radius of the latest tracked
whereabouts of a coronavirus patient.
The second cornerstone of the South Korean con-
tainment strategy was a broad implementation of
finding and immediate testing and isolation [26]. The
WHO recommends testing in suspected cases [27].
However, the decision as to what defines a suspected
case is left to the country in question. Some countries
limited the testing only to very symptomatic cases as
China did (e.g., Italy, Spain, and U.S.), whereas others
(e.g., Germany) followed the South Korean broad test-
ing strategy. The broad testing strategy was more
likely to identify even milder cases [28]. With this ap-
proach, South Korea achieved the highest diagnostic
rate for COVID-19 [24, 25].
Lessons learnt in Europe
The two models have been adapted differently to the
needs of individual countries in Europe (Fig. 2). How-
ever, the UK, Italy, Spain, and France have all
exceeded China’s official death toll. All of these na-
tions and the rest of the European Union (EU) now
Fig. 2 COVID-19 restriction measures in the European Union (reproduced from: https://covid-statistics.jrc.ec.europa.eu/Home/Maps. Licensed
under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) licence)
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face the difficult question of how and when to end
their respective lockdowns. It is not encouraging to
see the delays with which this emergency has been
understood.
Italy
In two cluster zones of Italy, the disease outpaced con-
tainment, and mitigation strategies were therefore estab-
lished. Following the Chinese model, Italy enforced a
lockdown limited to a red zone (the extent of which was
discussed with the local authorities). However, differ-
ently from China, lockdown was then extended at a na-
tional level (the largest lockdown in the history of
Europe) with different restriction measures (Fig. 2) [29].
Furthermore, differently from China, public transport
was never shut down completely and a pass system
allowed Italians to move within regional borders de-
pending on need.
Testing strategy was decided at a regional level due to
the decentralization of the health system in Italy. The
majority of positive cases traced back to two clusters in
two neighboring Italian regions, Lombardy and Veneto.
Veneto controlled the outbreak within its borders by
early and successful implementation of extensive testing,
proactive tracing, emphasis on home diagnosis, and pri-
mary care. The town of Vó, in Veneto, quashed an out-
break after relentless testing. Other regions in Italy have
not replicated the successful model implemented in
Veneto. In particular, Lombardy was much less aggres-
sive on these fronts and hospitals in Lombardy were
overwhelmed, while Veneto’s hospitals have been spared
in comparison.
During the acute phase of the epidemic, most hospitals
in Italy converted their facilities into models focused on
emergency care while waiting for the arrival of COVID-
19 cases. The number of intensive care beds was there-
fore increased whereas the access to outpatient facilities
intended for NCDs was limited.
Spain
In Spain, the availability of tests was also limited and
disease outpaced containment very quickly. Large public
gatherings were still permitted, and the day before the
announcement of the cancelation of classes in the Au-
tonomous community of Madrid at all educational levels
due to the great increase in cases in the region, 120,000
people gathered in the capital for International Women’s
Day (8 March). A few days later, the Spanish govern-
ment closed all schools and universities, shops, bars and
restaurants, and any place open to the public, at a na-
tional level. However, citizens were still allowed to go to
work and to treatment centers or to purchase basic ne-
cessities. All public and private healthcare facilities were
placed under the direct control of the Regional public
health authorities, the equivalent of the Italian Regions.
The emergency experienced by Spain highlighted the
risks of infection for healthcare workers. On 23 March,
5400 (nearly 14%) of Spain’s 40,000 confirmed cases
were healthcare professionals. When confirmed, they
were sent home, further straining the hospitals [30]. The
risks for healthcare personnel are mainly attributed to
reduced availability of masks and other Personal Protect-
ive Equipment (PPE) (gloves, eye glasses, protective
clothing, gowns and head covers, washing parapherna-
lia). However, the prevalence of infected healthcare pro-
fessionals is influenced by the testing strategy which in
Spain was reserved to symptomatic subjects [30]. In two
Dutch hospitals, 6% of symptomatic (fever or respiratory
symptoms) healthcare workers [31] were also found to
be infected. Conversely, among a non-selected sample of
healthcare workers in China, where the lack of PPE was
also evident, 110 out of 9684 health workers tested posi-
tive, with an infection rate of 1.1% [32]. In the Chinese
study, 84.5% of affected health workers had mild or
moderate illness. PPE is essential equipment that health
workers should be adequately provided with. However,
the high prevalence of mild clinical presentation, fre-
quently not including fever, suggests that the current
recommended case definition for suspected COVID-19
should be used less stringently, especially for the health-
care workforce [33].
To prevent the possibility that healthcare workers may
become prime vectors of transmission, in Wuhan,
healthcare workers seeing at-risk patients were housed
away from their families [26]. This issue is applicable to
all regions because the impact of infection in the health-
care workforce may well be great in low-middle-income
countries (LMICs) where human resources to replace
them are limited [27].
France
In France, a national lockdown was established on 18
March. On 12 March, the situation was declared to be
worrying enough to close all schools and universities
from 16 March. Yet on 15 March, the same government
had urged the French to vote in the first round of the
municipal elections in the country’s 35,000 cities, towns,
and villages. A second and final round of voting, initially
due to take place on 22 March, was then postponed.
In France, the reduction of outpatient facilities under-
taken by the healthcare system during lockdown was
mitigated by an existing telemedicine service subject to
reimbursement by national Social Security since 2018
[34]. Until early March, less than 10,000 teleconsulta-
tions a week were invoiced to the National Health Insur-
ance [34]; however, national confinement has
skyrocketed service. On the second week of national
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confinement, 486,369 teleconsultations were performed
in a single, although large, national public academic hos-
pital [35]. In the same period, around 44% of general
practitioners conducted at least one teleconsultation.
The pre-existing telemedicine regulations thus enabled
primary care and hospital doctors to switch from sched-
uled face-to-face consultations with patients they knew
personally, to reimbursed teleconsultations, when
suitable.
Germany
This country, heavily hit by the COVID-19 pandemic,
has shown one of the lowest death rates of COVID-19,
0.5% compared to France’s 5.2% and Spain’s 7%. Accord-
ing to data from the European Health Information Gate-
way [36], Germany has 621 critical care beds per 100,
000 people, Italy 275, and Spain 293 [36]. The massive
testing strategy implemented by Germany, with more
than 500,000 tests every week, played a crucial role in
the efficacy of containment. As noted above, the more
widely a country tests, the more milder cases it will find.
Importantly, Germany does not have a public health la-
boratory that would restrict other laboratories from per-
forming tests, and thus, the market has been open from
the beginning.
On 22 March, the German government also an-
nounced lockdown and national curfew with strict social
distancing measures. Germany has now started reopen-
ing some schools and has allowed businesses and reli-
gious venues to open their doors. It also reopened its
borders to neighboring countries by 15 June.
Russia
The rapid spread of the epidemic in Russia has
highlighted the strengths and weaknesses of an exten-
sive, albeit outdated, public health system. Testing cap-
acity is vast and was scaled up quickly (more than 200
laboratories were providing same-day test results). Large
testing programs may at least partly explain both the
high number of cases and the relatively low mortality
rate [37]. However, the COVID-19 outbreak in Russia
has been slow but unstoppable. Besides extensive testing,
early prevention measures included restricting the
border with China. International flights were not limited,
and the first confirmed cases in Moscow and in Saint
Petersburg were reported to be linked to Italy. Flights to
and from Italy, Germany, France, and Spain were then
limited. Although the containment and prevention
model seemed to have worked, at least initially, the
country has gone through just 2 months from having a
very low number of infections to becoming the second
most important epicenter of the pandemic behind the
United States. The quality of health care differs greatly
across Russia’s many regions. Russian health workers
were reported to be 16 times more likely to die from
COVID-19 than their counterparts in other countries
[38]. Like in many other countries, there have been con-
spicuous shortages of PPE.
No emergency situation was officially implemented in
Russia, i.e., all the institutional frameworks of power
have continued to function during the pandemic. Never-
theless, a presidential decree on the 2nd of April gave
governors the power to impose restrictions to prevent
the spread of coronavirus, to suspend the activities of
enterprises and organizations, and to establish a special
procedure for the movement of people and vehicles—ex-
cept for “vehicles carrying out interregional
transportation.”
The landing in North America
The United States of America
On 31 January 2020 [39], 2 weeks after the notifica-
tion of the first COVID-19 case [40, 41], Health and
Human Services Secretary Azar declared a public
health emergency effective 27 January 2020, affording
the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS)
the flexibility to quickly support Medicare beneficiar-
ies (Table 1). At the onset of the outbreak, testing
capacity was insufficient and public health officials
could not contain the spread of the disease. In par-
ticular, aside from the Center for Disease Control
(CDC), only diagnostic test makers were initially
allowed to develop tests for the coronavirus, while
public health laboratories were not. On 29 February,
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) changed its
policy and allowed public health agencies, hospitals,
and private companies to develop their own assays
and perform testing [42]. The country’s testing cap-
acity then substantially increased (running about 50,
000 to 70,000 coronavirus tests per day), and cur-
rently, there are 70 FDA-authorized tests on the mar-
ket [43]. However, some limitations still remain: many
of these tests are run on manual or semi-automated
systems; test makers also face shortages of reagents,
swabs, and various collection devices; a patient has to
be completely symptomatic to get a test according to
guidelines stipulated with Departments of Health. On
4 March, the CDC relaxed the criteria to allow doc-
tors the discretion to decide who would be eligible
for tests. More precisely, the criteria for evaluation of
persons for testing for COVID-19 were expanded to
include a wider group of symptomatic patients.
The effect of the highly decentralized U.S. health sys-
tem, a similar situation to Italy, must also be considered.
Measures were imposed at a local community level with
different scope and severity. Communities generally im-
plemented the so-called social distancing measures as
well, such as canceling conferences, sporting events, and
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Table 1 The extent of the spread of the virus and timeline of National responses





China 27 December 2019, first notification to the local center for disease control and
prevention (CDC) and health commissions; end of December 2019, suspension of
passenger trains to and from Wuhan; 1 January, seafood market closure; 20
January, the NHC started publishing daily data on confirmed and suspected
cases; 21 January, government officials warned against hiding the disease; 22
January, Hubei announced a Class 2 Response to Public Health Emergency; 23
January, Wuhan declared lockdown and the province of Zhejiang announced
Class 1 Response to Public Health Emergency; 26 January, the State Council
extended the 2020 Spring Festival holiday; 27 January, MoE advised all higher
education institutions to postpone the new spring semester; 3 February, local
governments and companies across the nation encouraged remote working
(home office); 7 February, the Chinese Ministry of Education shared instructions





South Korea 20 January, first notification; 4 February, denying entry to foreigners traveling
from Hubei Province; 18 February, most universities in South Korea postponed
the start of the spring semester; 23 February, all kindergartens, elementary
schools, middle schools, and high schools were announced to delay the semester
start; 25 February, Daegu officials were aggressively warning residents to take
precautions, while allowing private businesses such as restaurants to stay open
51,269,185 12,257 280
Europe
Italy 23 January, first notification; 31 January, flights to and from China suspended
and state of emergency declared; 20 February, patient tested positive in
Lombardy; 21 February, two people tested positive in Veneto; 22 February,
lockdown of 11 municipalities in Lombardy and Veneto (red zone); 1 March, the
Italian national territory was divided into three areas (red zone with whole
population in quarantine; yellow zone, social and sport events suspended and
schools, theaters, clubs and cinemas are closed; rest of the national territory,
where safety and prevention measures are advertised in public places); 4 March,
shutdown of all schools and universities nationwide; 8 March, lockdown to all of
Lombardy and 14 other northern provinces and on the following day to all of
Italy; 11 March, all commercial activities except for supermarkets and pharmacies
were closed; 21 March, the Italian government closed all non-essential businesses
and industries and restricted movement of people; 26 April, movements across
regions are still forbidden, while the ones between municipalities are allowed only
for work and health reasons, as well as for visits to relatives; reopening of manu-
facturing industries and construction sites is allowed; 18 May, most businesses
could reopen, and free movement was granted to all citizens within their Region
60,465,149 237,828 34,448
Spain 31 January, first notification; 14 March, lockdown was imposed; 17 March, a
national state of emergency was declared, mobilizing the army and ordering the
closure of schools and universities, shops, bars and restaurants, and any place
open to the public. Citizens’ movements are allowed only to go to work and to
treatment centers or the doctor or to purchase basic necessities, such as food and
medicine. All the hospitals and private healthcare facilities in the country were
placed under the direct control of the regional public health authorities
46,754,778 244,683 27,136
France 24 January, first notification; 16 March, the beginning of a lockdown period was
announced and all schools and all universities were closed; 17 March, ban on all
travel except relating to professional activity, buying essential goods, health or
family reasons or brief individual exercise, closure of all non-essential public places,
including restaurants, cafés, cinemas, and nightclubs; 17 March, the Direction gén-
érale de la Santé (DGS) asked Santé publique France to buy urgently 1.1 million of
FFP2 masks; 11 May–1 June, phase 1 of lockdown lifting; 2 June, phase 2 of lock-
down lifting
65,267,844 194,805 29,578
Germany 27 January, first notification; 13 March, school and kindergarten closures,
postponing academic semesters and prohibiting visits to nursing homes to
protect the elderly; 15 March, borders to five neighboring countries were closed;
22 March, prohibited physical contact with more than one person who resides
outside of a household, curfews were imposed in six German states while other
states instead opting for strict social distancing measures
83,783,942 188,604 8868
UK 31 January, first notification; 3 March, the UK Government unveiled their
Coronavirus Action Plan; 12 March, the government announced it was moving
out of the contain phase and into the delay phase of the response to the
67,886,011 300,717 42,238
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Table 1 The extent of the spread of the virus and timeline of National responses (Continued)




coronavirus outbreak; 17 March, NHS England announced that all non-urgent op-
erations in England would be postponed from 15 April to free up 30,000 beds; 26
March, the Health Protection (Coronavirus, Restrictions) (England) Regulations
2020 made the sweeping restrictions (national lockdown) legally enforceable; 4
April, Johnson was admitted to Hospital, 12 April, left the hospital; April, shortage
of chemical reagents needed for COVID-19 testing; 10 May, Prime Minister
Johnson asked those who could not work from home to go to work, avoiding
public transport if possible
Russia 30 January, Chinese–Russian border was shut; 31 January, first notification; 17
March, closing all cultural institutions under its jurisdiction, including museums,
theaters, symphonies, and circuses; 23 March, all Russian schools were closed; 24
March, instruction to regional authorities to suspend activities of any nightclubs,
cinemas, and children’s entertainment centers and to ban hookah smoking at any
restaurants or cafes; 25 March, the 2020 Russian constitutional referendum was
postponed; 27 March, international flights were grounded; 28 March, all
universities were closed; 30 March, lockdown started; 11 April, Moscow’s mayor
introduced a digital pass system to enforce the coronavirus lockdown; 11 May,




Middle East and North Africa (MENA)
Israel 21 February, first notification; 11 March, Israel limited gatherings to 100 people;
12 March, all universities and schools were closed; 17 March, a Knesset
committee approved the contact-tracing program
8,655,535 19,894 303
Iran 24 February, first notification; 25 February, declared lockdown procedures 83,992,949 195,051 9185
Tunisia 2 March, first notification; 12 March, schools and all universities were closed; 18
March, curfew from 6 p.m. to 6 a.m.; 23 March, general confinement
11,818,619 1128 50
Egypt 14 February, first notification; 19 March, restaurants, cafes, nightclubs, and public
places throughout the country were closed from seven in the evening until six in
the morning, decision to close the airports and suspended all air travel; 21 March,
decision was made to suspend prayers in all of Egypt’s mosque, the Coptic
Orthodox Church also announced the closure of all churches and the suspension




Yemen 10 April, first notification 29,825,964 902 244
Africa
Nigeria 27 February, first notification; 19 March, Federal government announced the
closure of tertiary institutions, secondary and primary schools; Anambra State
government announced the closure of their schools and suspension of public
gatherings indefinitely, tertiary institutions to close from 20 March, while primary
and secondary schools to close from 27 March, Ogun State government extended
an earlier ban to schools and religious centers in the state indefinitely; 21 March,
Nigeria announced the closure of their international airports, Enugu, Port Harcourt,
and Kano airports; 1 June, the federal government announced the reopening of





South Africa 5 March, first confirmed case; 15 March, declaration of a national state of disaster;
26 March, national lockdown started; 1 May, a gradual and phased easing of the
lockdown restrictions started, lowering the national alert level to 4, to be lowered
to level 3 from 1 June
59,308,690 80,412 1674
Mozambique
22 March, first notification 31,255,435 651 4
America
U.S. 20 January, first notification; 29 January, the White House Coronavirus Task Force
was established; 31 January, public health emergency was declared; 2 February,
prevent the entry of most foreign nationals who had recently traveled to China;
29 February, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) began allowing public
health agencies, hospitals, and private companies to develop tests and perform
testing; 5 March, the CDC relax the criteria to allow doctors discretion to decide
who would be eligible for tests; 13 March, national emergency was declared;
State and local responses to the outbreak were different including prohibitions
and cancelation of large-scale gatherings (including festivals and sporting events),
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other large gatherings. This also happened for schools.
The CDC advised colleges to suspend classes and events
only if they had identified cases of COVID-19 within
their communities. With a proactive action, about 300
universities and colleges around the U.S. canceled in-
person classes in March and 520 campuses across 47
states shut down [44]. Accordingly, different strategies
were implemented across different U.S. states and cities,
with clearly different results. This makes the U.S. a
much closer comparison to Italy, rather than to Asian
countries such as China and South Korea.
Latin America
Most countries in the region, including Chile, Argentina,
Colombia, and Brazil, have implemented stay-at-home
measures, shut down borders, and closed businesses
(Fig. 1) [45]. Much hinges on how authorities manage
the current health crisis and the economic fallout in
countries with fragile health systems, a high proportion
of workers in the informal sector, and weak fiscal and
monetary firepower.
Brazil
In Brazil, the Ministry of Health raised the emergency
alert and declared a Public Health Emergency of
International Concern even before the first case in
the country (Table 1). However, few country-wide
measures to slow the spread of the virus were taken
and the country faces some of the highest numbers of
infection in the world. Since the federal government
decided not to cancel classes in the whole country,
municipal, state, and private schools and universities
had different reactions regarding suspension, replace-
ment with remote education, or simply postponement.
In Brazil, there have been no nationwide guidelines
for primary healthcare services in the COVID-19 re-
sponse. Brazil performed testing only on patients with
severe symptoms, and a shortage of materials such as
masks, N95 masks, gloves, and hand sanitizer was re-
ported [46, 47]. Since community health workers in
Brazil are not considered to be health professionals,
only an estimated 9% have received infection control
training and personal protective equipment [46].
Ecuador
In Ecuador, described as a possible epicenter of COVID-
19 in Latin America, minor measures were taken and
the health system was overwhelmed in Guayas Province
[48]. The number of deaths is believed to be significantly
higher than the official figure due to a low rate of testing
[48].
Eastern Mediterranean region
As of 6 May, the disease has spread across the 22
countries in the Eastern Mediterranean region. Avail-
able figures (Table 1) probably underestimate the ex-
tent of the spread of the virus because of the
inadequate case reporting across the region. The East-
ern Mediterranean region is home to both the
wealthiest and the poorest countries in the world, and
the responses of countries were uneven, ranging from
restrictive temporary lockdowns to denial and more
lax approaches [49]. Iran reported the first confirmed
cases of infection in the region. The government can-
celed public events and Friday prayers, closed schools,
universities, shopping centers, bazaars, and holy
shrines, and banned festival celebrations. Plans to
quarantine entire cities and areas were initially
rejected by the government, and heavy traffic between
cities continued.
The Israeli government proposed allowing the Israel
Security Agency to follow the South Korean model by
tracking the previous movements of people diagnosed
with coronavirus through their mobile phones to identify
people with whom infected individuals came into con-
tact. The Knesset committee approved the contact-
Table 1 The extent of the spread of the virus and timeline of National responses (Continued)




suspended routine visa services at all American embassies and consulates
worldwide
Brazil 28 January, the Ministry of Health in Brazil raised the emergency alert to level 2
of 3, considering an “imminent threat” for Brazil; 3 February, the Minister of
Health declared a Public Health Emergency of International Concern; 25 February,
first notification in Brazil; 21 March, the State of São Paulo declared a state-wide
quarantine; 7 May, cities in the northern states of Amazonas and Pará begun issu-
ing lockdown measures; 9 May, the government of Rio Grande do Sul established




Ecuador 29 February, first notification; 14 March, the government announced the closure
of its borders; 24 March, police moved to dismantle open markets; early April,
the health system in Guayas Province was overwhelmed
17,643,054
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tracing program. Within the first 2 days, 400 individuals
who had been in proximity to an infected person were
advised to enter a 14-day self-quarantine period. The se-
curity measure was in place for only 30 days. Critics
branded the proposal an invasion of privacy and civil
liberties.
The African Region
The COVID-19 pandemic continues to expand in the
African Region, and all African countries now have con-
firmed cases [50, 51]. According to the official bulletin
of the African Union Disease Control and Prevention
Centers (CDC Africa), South Africa remains the country
with the highest number of cases ascertained. Delayed
and incomplete data reporting, lack of data sharing, and
unavailability of testing may limit epidemiological ana-
lyses. At the beginning of February, only Senegal and
South Africa had the ability to test for the novel corona-
virus. The WHO has been supporting African govern-
ments considerably, and 42 laboratories in capital cities
are now performing testing [52]. The WHO is also help-
ing local authorities craft radio messaging and TV adver-
tisements to inform the public about the risks of
COVID-19 and what measures should be taken [50–52].
Countries such as South Africa (with the highest burden
of HIV) has acted quickly with severe social distancing
or isolation restrictions imposed [53]. Kenya, Ghana,
Rwanda, Mali, and Nigeria are among other African
countries to impose restrictions to curb transmission of
the coronavirus [54]. Several African countries have
banned weddings, funerals, and large religious gather-
ings. Many countries have also shut down schools [55].
In most LMICs including many African countries and
several South Asian countries, the health system is weak,
especially for specialized care such as intensive care.
Creative approaches are required to protect people from
contamination, such as strict social distancing policies
and intensification of contact tracing; these are especially
necessary given the strong social structures such as the
extended family systems in many of these countries.
Impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on NCDs
The negative implications of IPC strategies on cardiovas-
cular health have recently been discussed [56, 57]. In
China, a significant reduction in emergency department
(ED) visits related to different disciplines was observed
early on in the first weeks of the pandemic [58]. Al-
though this may highlight the overuse of EDs by non-
emergency and non-complex cases that could be man-
aged by general practitioners, there may also be a worri-
some tendency to postpone consultations with
specialists, even when necessary [59]. The consensus is
that patients were avoiding going to hospitals because
they feared getting infected with COVID-19 [60];
patients with NCDs might indeed consider themselves at
increased risk of severe COVID-19 [61–68] and there-
fore avoid or delay referral.
According to a recent report of the CDC, the total
number of U.S. ED visits was 42% lower than during the
same period a year earlier [69]. The largest declines were
in visits for abdominal pain and other digestive or ab-
dominal signs and symptoms and essential hypertension
[69]. Although not in the top 20 declining diagnoses,
visits for acute myocardial infarction also decreased. Re-
cent reports from scientific societies in Italy [70, 71],
Spain [72], and the U.S. [73] also suggest a substantial
reduction in admission for stroke or myocardial infarc-
tion since the start of the outbreak. Importantly, people
with heart attacks who arrived at the hospital did so late.
Health messages that reinforce the importance of imme-
diately seeking care for symptoms of serious conditions,
such as myocardial infarction, are necessary.
Another important issue is a shortage of healthcare
staff and facilities to cover both COVID-19-related ill-
ness and all other routine medical care. A nationwide
survey conducted in April found that a quarter of cancer
patients receiving active treatment in the U.S. had seen
their care delayed. A recent WHO survey looked at the
extent of the disruption of services for the prevention
and treatment of NCDs [74]. The survey showed that
81% of responding countries abolished rehabilitation
care, and 47% completely or partially abolished palliative
care facilities. Additionally, while two thirds (63%) re-
ported that services for cardiovascular disease emergen-
cies have not been disrupted, this was only the case for a
quarter (24%) of hypertension management services. In
particular, admissions to facility care perceived as non-
essential were limited, and population screening pro-
grams were temporarily suspended in 61% of cases [74].
On the other hand, many countries have realized the
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on NCD patients
and experimented new care models [75–85].
Managing NCD outpatients in the COVID-19 era
Simple remote approaches, such as telephone consult-
ation, are already key to many NCD management pro-
grams, such as for heart failure [75, 76], and can now be
adapted to limit the need for a clinic visit to receive drug
prescriptions. In this context, telemedicine [77, 78], par-
ticularly video consultations [79], has been promoted
and scaled up to reduce the risk of transmission, espe-
cially in France [34], the UK [79], and the U.S. [80, 81].
In France where telemedicine was already authorized, re-
imbursed, and actively promoted, the pre-existing regu-
lation has recently been reinforced [82] to limit the
number of individuals grouping in waiting rooms, to
screen and detect suspected patients, and to allow
follow-up from home.
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Initiatives have been taken for authorization and reim-
bursement of teleconsultation in the U.S. [83] and various
European countries since the outbreak of COVID-19 [84,
85]. Belgian public health insurance recently approved the
reimbursement of teleconsultations by doctors [86].
Belgium is in line with many other countries worldwide,
such as Israel [87], France [88], Italy [89], and Australia
[85], which all use telemedicine to a growing extent to
fight the COVID-19 pandemic.
Most countries, however, lack a regulatory framework
to authorize, integrate, and reimburse telemedicine ser-
vices, including in emergency and outbreak situations
[80, 90]. Two possibilities are currently available for pa-
tients: [1] direct-to-consumer telemedicine with private
providers mostly relying on out-of-pocket or private insur-
ance payment and [2] free solutions, mainly from com-
panies like WhatsApp, Skype, or Facetime, that may not
respect national health data privacy and security require-
ments. Although these solutions may be useful to support
and alleviate the pressure on healthcare systems during
the outbreak, to date, they are mostly not integrated
within national healthcare systems and do not share data
with public health authorities for epidemiological surveil-
lance [34]. For countries without integrated telemedicine
in their national healthcare system, the COVID-19 pan-
demic is a wake-up call to adopt the necessary regulatory
framework to support wide adoption of telemedicine [34].
In this context, Italy does not include telemedicine in the
essential levels of care granted to all citizens within the
National Health Service.
Freely accessible home-based telemedicine software
platforms respecting privacy and security requirements
are now available [91]. Telemedicine systems range from
simple video conference tools to perform a secure med-
ical consultation (interactive medicine) to sophisticated
software and hardware combinations for diagnosing con-
ditions and developing treatment plans (store and for-
ward, and remote patient monitoring). The store and
forward type of telemedicine allows providers (primary
care physicians) to share patient information with a spe-
cialist in another location. Remote patient monitoring
permits providers to monitor their patients in their own
homes [91, 92]. Doxy.me is a free platform where the
physician can create a virtual room and start providing
telemedicine services to patients. The software is certi-
fied for storing the information relating to patients and
treatments provided to them. AMC Health focuses on
health monitoring and care coordination via FDA-
approved medical devices. This includes tracking and
Bluetooth connectivity to allow the operation of remote
devices to send biometric data, which can be provided
by either the patient or a caregiver. Telemonitoring may
add significant value to managing chronic diseases and
avoiding infection with COVID-19.
Problems/difficulties we are still facing today and
possible solutions
Language and technological barriers
Remote consultation poses challenges for clinicians who
need to deliver care to patients with migrant back-
grounds or language/technological barriers. WHO
leaders appeal for more attention for refugees and non-
documented migrants who often have poor language
proficiency and legal, administrative, and financial obsta-
cles when accessing health care [93]. Although migration
flows are likely to decrease, the number of international
migrants may not decrease immediately, as migrants are
unable to return to their countries due to travel bans
and disruption of transport services. Migrant workers
tend to be more vulnerable to loss of jobs and wages in
the host country than native workers. In addition, lock-
down in work camps and dormitories can increase the
risk of contagion among migrant workers. Finally, tele-
medicine as well as the current mantra “Stay Home” can
hardly be extended to homeless populations. Cities with
large homeless populations may face unique challenges
when trying to contain COVID-19 [94, 95]. Policy
makers should consider the risk of increasing health in-
equality [96].
The elderly
As in other health emergencies, institutionalized elderly
people are often the invisible part of the crisis; outbreaks
in nursing homes are now a major problem [97, 98]. It is
important to understand specific transmission dynamics
to inform strategies to prevent introduction or spread of
COVID-19 in nursing homes for the elderly. COVID-19
is often introduced by the staff, who are much less
equipped and educated about the handling of the disease
than hospitals are.
Suspension of visits and personal aids with extended
barrier measures, the establishment of safe supply
chains, isolation of cases, sanitation, and limitation of in-
ternal activities were recommended in France to reduce
the risk of introduction of severe acute respiratory
syndrome-coronavirus-2 (SARS-CoV-2) in retirement fa-
cilities. However, in France, as of 15 March 2020, people
older than 75 years accounted for 20% of the confirmed
cases but 79% of the deaths [99].
The issue of loneliness is especially relevant for the
elderly, who may not receive the optimal social support
necessary at this stage in life, due to the physical and so-
cial distancing guidelines. The elderly living in nursing
homes may experience increased anxiety due to reports
that some facilities have been severely affected by deaths
and spread of infection. The use of online technology is
a useful means of providing support networks and a
sense of belonging, but clashes with the existence of eco-
nomic disparity in accessing or reading digital resources.
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A more sustainable strategy is one that involves simple
interventions such as more frequent telephone contacts
with family and close friends, voluntary organizations or
health professionals, or community outreach projects
that provide peer support during forced isolation. Inter-
ventions to support mental health may be crucial in
these populations.
Low-income regions
In low-income regions, people often live in very close
proximity to each other (e.g., in Pakistan, the majority of
households include more than 6 people). The economic
consequences of COVID-19 are likely to be significant,
and this will affect NCD patients who rely on their fam-
ilies for their care financially. Often, people living in
these settings also have both malnutrition and NCDs.
Many countries are advising their citizens to stay at
home. Staying at home will directly affect economic ac-
tivities particularly for the most disadvantaged members
in society. With the sudden loss of income or access to
social support, vulnerability can change dynamically de-
pending on the policy response [96]. A creative approach
can be adopted locally. In most African countries, hyper-
tension clinics are still running and a system of triage by
phone would mean a lower level of contamination.
WHO recommendations for the rational use of PPE in
healthcare and community settings have been provided
[100, 101]. However, there may be a shortage of dispos-
able masks and protective clothing; in this case, (non-
disposable) clothing and some masks can be sterilized
and re-used. We need to propose that all people who go
to markets, where there is high population density, and
who use public transport, should use PPE to protect
themselves and others from contamination. In the ab-
sence of masks, people should use something, even a
piece of cloth washed every day [102]; according to the
CDC recommendations, in settings where facemasks are
not available, homemade masks (e.g., bandana, scarf) can
be used as a last resort [103]. However, homemade
masks are not considered PPE, since their capability to
protect is unknown.
Clinical trial integrity
The coronavirus pandemic threatens the integrity of on-
going clinical trials for interventions that may benefit
NCD patients [104]. Mitigation efforts may interfere
with all aspects of a clinical trial. Both the U.S. FDA (18
March) [105] and the European Medicine Agency (25
March) [106, 107] issued guidance for industry, investi-
gators, and institutional review boards conducting clin-
ical trials during the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic.
The impact on the data collection, analysis, and in-
terpretation of results for each trial will need a thor-
ough case-by-case assessment. The approach to stop
randomized trials that do not provide a clear immedi-
ate benefit to the enrolled participants is difficult to
apply because the benefits of the interventions are
unknown until the completion of the study. Support-
ing ongoing trials could conversely help millions of
people obtain substantial and lasting health benefits
that will be important once the coronavirus pandemic
ends. Therefore, efforts and resources should be dedicated
to supporting randomized trials using creative and
thoughtful methods and proactive planning. The adjust-
ment of protocols to limit hospital visits for outpatients
may facilitate continuous adherence to the intervention
and recruitment for ongoing trials. The conclusion of on-
going trials could lead to important benefits for many pa-
tients with NCDs [104].
Fake news
Misinformation stating that the use of antihypertensive
medication, namely angiotensin-converting enzyme in-
hibitor (ACEI) and angiotensin-receptor blocker (ARB)
treatments, may increase the risk of SARS-CoV-2 infec-
tion or the severity of the disease has created confusion
for millions of hypertensive patients and clinicians alike.
This point is crucial because such a message may dis-
suade patients from keeping to their treatment regimen.
At this stage, there is no clear data on humans from ran-
domized controlled trials, to recommend any clinical ac-
tion. Clinical societies, the European Society of
Hypertension, the European Society of Cardiology Coun-
cil on Hypertension, and the International Society of
Hypertension, have reinforced that there is currently not
enough information to make recommendations and have
reiterated that there is no reason to stop ACEI/ARB
treatment in stable patients [108–111]. The most com-
mon fake news has been discussed, and the WHO is
launching an official app for iOS and Android that is be-
ing designed to combat the spread of misinformation
about COVID-19 [112].
Conclusions
In the initial stages of the COVID-19 pandemic, decision
makers and people were often reluctant to enforce IPC
strategies due to the financial consequences of an eco-
nomic shutdown. In many countries, IPC strategies were
overlooked and conflicting messages were released to
the population.
When IPC strategies were finally implemented, the
media and health systems focus on the treatment and
outcome of COVID-19 patients with a consequent lower
priority for patients affected by chronic NCDs, such as
heart disease, diabetes, and cancer. Outpatient facilities
for NCDs (mainly hypertension and diabetes) have been
suspended in several countries.
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While responding to COVID-19, policy makers
should consider the risk of increasing health inequal-
ities. Considering that many LMICs have not yet
reached the peak of the COVID-19 pandemic, it
would be helpful for clinicians to share with their pa-
tients the treatment and care strategies to follow dur-
ing possible future lockdown periods.
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